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THE LAWS OF AGENCY LAWYERING 
George M. Cohen* 
INTRODUCTION 
A significant part of lawyering in the regulatory state involves lawyers 
appearing and practicing before federal administrative agencies on behalf of 
clients.1  In performing this role, as in other contexts, lawyers are 
themselves regulated by multiple, overlapping legal regimes.  These 
regimes include state ethics rules, tort and criminal law, and, when 
regulatory matters wind up in court, rules of procedure and rules derived 
from the courts’ inherent supervisory powers.  Lawyers appearing and 
practicing before federal agencies, however, are often subject to additional 
ethical rules promulgated by the agencies.2  By ethical rules, I mean rules 
that regulate lawyers and can be enforced by limiting or prohibiting the 
ability of the lawyer to practice before the agency.3  The most well-known 
of these agency rules are the SEC’s Sarbanes-Oxley rules, the IRS’s 
Circular 230 rules, and the U.S. Patent and Trade Office’s (USPTO) 
practice rules, but there are a number of others. 
 
*  Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law, University of Virginia.  I thank Joshua Allred for 
excellent research assistance and Laurel Terry, Charles Silver, and participants at the 
Fordham Law Review colloquium Lawyering in the Regulatory State for helpful comments.  
For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword:  Lawyering in the 
Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016). 
 
 1. Other important aspects of lawyering in the regulatory state involve lawyers 
employed by government agencies and lawyers appearing and practicing before state 
government agencies.  This Article does not deal with either topic. 
 2. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b (AM. LAW 
INST. 2000) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)] (“Some administrative agencies, primarily 
within the federal government, have also regulated lawyers practicing before the agency, 
sometimes through lawyer codes adopted by the agency and specifically applicable to those 
practitioners.”); Daniel R. Coquillete & Judith A. McMorrow, Zacharias’s Prophecy:  The 
Federalization of Legal Ethics Through Legislative, Court, and Agency Regulation, 48 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 123 (2011). 
 3. This definition omits agency rules that regulate lawyers but reference no sanction. 
See, e.g., 46 C.F.R. § 502.26 (2015) (stating that a lawyer practicing before the Federal 
Maritime Commission must conform to the ABA Model Rules as well as agency rules, but 
specifying no sanction for violation); cf. id. § 502.27(c) (stating that the Commission may 
sanction nonattorneys admitted to practice before it for improper professional conduct).  This 
definition also omits rules that limit sanctions to those against a lawyer’s client or monetary 
sanctions against the lawyer. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 3.506(b) (2015) (requiring attorneys 
practicing before the Public Health Service to conform to standards of conduct and ethics 
required of practitioners before U.S. courts); id. § 3.530 (listing as sanctions for lawyer 
misconduct sanctions against the claimant and payment of attorney’s fees); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 160.530 (2015) (same for lawyers practicing before the Department of Health and Human 
Services). 
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Commentators have long debated the authority of agencies to promulgate 
and enforce these rules, as well as their desirability.4  One feature of the 
regulatory landscape, however, has received less critical attention:  the great 
variety of agency rules governing lawyers.  Although state ethics rules 
exhibit a fair amount of variety, these rules are almost all based on the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
and generally cover the same topics in relatively similar ways.  Moreover, 
the “other law”5 that governs lawyers—though it may differ from and 
sometimes conflict with state ethics rules—is similar enough across 
jurisdictions that a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers is fairly 
able to summarize it.6  By contrast, the federal agency rules seem to be all 
over the map.  Some are quite detailed; others are extremely general.  Some 
cover a large number of topics; others very few.  Some apply only to 
adjudicatory proceedings before agencies; others apply more broadly.  
Some apply to lawyers only; others to any person appearing in a 
representative capacity before an agency. 
What accounts for this teeming variety of agency rules governing 
lawyers?  One obvious answer is that there is nothing to prevent it.  There is 
no private group like the ABA or the American Law Institute (ALI) that has 
sought to bring order out of the chaos through proposed Model Rules for 
Lawyers Appearing and Practicing Before Administrative Agencies.  Nor 
has any government entity or group of agencies taken up such a project.  In 
the absence of some great coordinator, it is perhaps not surprising that a 
hundred flowers bloom.  Agencies have different domains, different 
structures, different purposes, and different histories.  All these can lead to 
different regulatory approaches.  Still, laws sometimes do converge rather 
than diverge even in the absence of coordination, as lawyers often look to 
what others are doing and follow them rather than “reinvent the wheel.” 
Another possibility is that there is less to the variety than first meets the 
eye.  The differences may be more stylistic than substantive.  Alternatively, 
the rules may not be enforced often enough, or in significant enough cases, 
that the differences become more apparent and contested. 
At the very least, the great variety of agency rules governing lawyers 
raises interesting questions that are worth exploring.  This Article begins 
that exploration.  Part I lays the groundwork by briefly examining how the 
ABA Model Rules treat regulatory lawyering to raise the question of what 
regulatory gaps the agency rules might be expected to fill.  Part II sets forth 
several possible theories of agency rule variation.  Part III compares agency 
rules along a number of dimensions, examines some similarities and 
differences across agencies as well as between the agency rules and the 
Model Rules, and offers speculations about what may be driving the 
differences that exist. 
 
 4. See, e.g., Michael P. Cox, Regulation of Attorneys Practicing Before Federal 
Agencies, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173 (1984). 
 5. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(e) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015). 
 6. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2. 
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I.  ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LAWYERING 
UNDER THE ABA MODEL RULES 
Before examining the ethics rules promulgated by the agencies, it will be 
helpful to see how the ABA’s Model Rules regulate lawyers who practice 
before government agencies.  They do so in three ways.  First, the Model 
Rules include a small number of rules specifically applicable to lawyers 
practicing before agencies.  Second, the Model Rules impose different 
obligations on lawyers practicing before agencies depending on which 
governmental function the agency is engaged in.  Finally, the Model Rules 
in some cases incorporate the requirements of agency ethics rules. 
A.  Specific Rules on Agency Lawyering 
The ABA Model Rules are constructed on the general presumption that 
all lawyers should be governed by the same ethics rules.7  Thus, lawyers 
who practice before administrative agencies8 are generally bound by the 
same ethics rules as other lawyers.  Nevertheless, the Model Rules deviate 
from this principle in several respects.  In the first place, a few scattered 
rules impose additional obligations on lawyers practicing before 
administrative agencies, though these rules involve relatively minor aspects 
of agency practice.9 
Most notably, Rule 3.9 requires a lawyer “representing a client before a 
legislative body or administrative agency in a nonadjudicative proceeding” 
to “disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity.”10  This 
Rule aims to prevent lawyers from misleading an agency into thinking that 
a lawyer appearing before the agency is presenting the lawyer’s own views.  
 
 7. The Preamble to the Model Rules, for example, contains provisions addressed to the 
responsibilities of “a lawyer.” See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (“Every 
lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”).  Moreover, 
most of the Model Rules apply to all lawyers, with a few exceptions and qualifications.  The 
rules do temper the universalist approach somewhat by differentiating a lawyer’s obligations 
when performing different roles, such as “Counselor” or “Advocate,” which I discuss further 
below. See generally David Wilkins, Making Context Count:  Regulating Lawyers After 
Kaye Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1152–54 (1993).  In addition, Model Rule 1.13 
applies to lawyers representing entity clients, and Model Rule 3.8 applies to prosecutors. 
 8. The Model Rules somewhat unhelpfully use the terms “administrative agency,” 
“government agency,” and “governmental entity” interchangeably, as does the Restatement, 
which also occasionally uses the term “regulatory agency.” 
 9. A few comments reference practice before government agencies as simply an 
example of how a general rule applies in that particular context. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2.3 cmt. 1 (noting that a government agency may request that a lawyer 
provide an opinion); id. r. 4.2 cmt. 4 (noting that a lawyer representing a client in a 
controversy before a government agency may communicate with nonlawyer representatives 
of the agency on a separate matter). 
 10. Id. r. 3.9.  Rule 4.3 imposes a similar obligation on a lawyer dealing with an 
unrepresented person who “misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter” to “make 
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.” Id. r. 4.3.  Rule 3.9 goes beyond the 
Rule 4.3 duty, because administrative agencies are often represented by counsel when they 
act in “nonadjudicative proceedings.” Id. r. 3.9.  In adjudicative proceedings, the issue would 
not generally arise because lawyers usually enter an appearance on behalf of an identified 
client litigant. 
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Note, however, that (somewhat surprisingly) under the literal terms of this 
Rule, the lawyer need not identify the client.11  In the parlance of (private) 
agency law, a lawyer cannot act on behalf of an undisclosed principal, but 
can act on behalf of an unidentified principal.12 
Two other rules that reference agency practice are Rule 8.4(e) and Rule 
7.5(a).  Rule 8.4(e) prohibits a lawyer from “stat[ing] or imply[ing] an 
ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to 
achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
other law.”13  Rule 7.5(a) prohibits a lawyer in private practice from using a 
“trade name” that “impl[ies] a connection with a government agency.”14  
These rules aim to prevent the lawyer from misleading the client about what 
a lawyer can legitimately do to further the client’s interests before the 
agency. 
B.  The Tripartite Division of Agency Conduct 
A second way the Model Rules address lawyers who practice before 
government agencies is by making some ethics rules inapplicable to certain 
types of agency practice.  The Model Rules in effect establish a tripartite 
structure for lawyers practicing before government agencies, depending 
roughly on whether the agency is acting in a judicial, legislative, or 
executive capacity.  When an agency “act[s] in an adjudicative capacity,” it 
is a “tribunal” under Rule 1.0(m).15  That label matters because the Model 
Rules include a number of provisions specifically applicable to a lawyer 
practicing before a “tribunal,” many—but not all—of which are found in 
the group of rules falling under the heading captioned “Advocate” (Rules 
3.1–3.9).16 
 
 11. The parallel rule in the Restatement, section 104(1), states that a “lawyer 
representing a client before a legislature or administrative agency . . . must disclose that the 
appearance is in a representative capacity and not misrepresent the capacity in which the 
lawyer appears.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 104(1).  Section 104(1) does not 
limit its application to administrative agencies acting in a “nonadjudicative capacity,” as 
Rule 3.9 does, but applies to all lawyers who represent a client “before” an administrative 
agency. Id.  It is not clear what the prohibition on “misrepresent[ing] the capacity in which 
the lawyer appears,” which is not included in Rule 3.9, adds to the requirement that the 
appearance in a representative capacity must be disclosed. Id. 
 12. Id. § 104(2). 
 13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(e). 
 14. Id. r. 7.5(a). 
 15. Id. r. 1.0(m) (stating that an agency will be considered a “tribunal” if “a neutral 
official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render 
a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interest in a particular matter”). 
 16. See id. rr. 3.3, 3.4(c), 3.5 (all expressly referring to a “tribunal”).  Other rules 
specifically mentioning tribunals include rules on overseeing conflict screens, id. rr. 
1.10(a)(2)(ii), 1.12(c)(1), withdrawal, id. r. 1.16(c), multijurisdictional practice, id. r. 
5.5(c)(2) & cmts. 9–11, and choice of law, id. r. 8.5(b)(1).  Some rules that mention tribunals 
would generally not be applicable to lawyers practicing before an administrative agency for 
other reasons. See id. r. 1.7(b)(3) (conflict of interest if lawyer represents both sides in same 
case); id. r. 3.8(d) (prosecutors in criminal cases); id. r. 6.2(a) (appointment of lawyer by 
tribunal).  A number of comments also make reference to a tribunal. See id. r. 1.1 cmt. 7; id. 
r. 1.2 cmt. 2; id. r. 1.6 cmts. 15, 16; id. r. 1.14 cmt. 10; id. r. 1.17 cmt. 12; id. r. 2.4 cmt. 5; id. 
r. 3.7 cmt. 3; id. r. 5.3 cmt. 4. 
2016] THE LAWS OF AGENCY LAWYERING 1967 
When the agency acts in a legislative (rulemaking) capacity, lawyers 
practicing before that agency are bound by some, but not all, of the rules 
applicable to advocates practicing before tribunals.17  Rule 3.9 identifies 
specific rules that a lawyer in this situation must follow:  Rules 3.3(a) 
through (c) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4(a) through (c) (Fairness to 
Opposing Party and Counsel), and 3.5 (Impartiality and Decorum of the 
Tribunal).18  The negative implication is that these lawyers are not bound 
by the other rules in the “Advocate” group.  In addition, these lawyers are 
not bound by any rules outside of the “Advocate” group that apply to 
lawyers practicing before “tribunals.” 
Finally, lawyers representing private clients who engage with an agency 
acting in what we might call its executive capacity have fewer obligations 
still.  Comment 3 to Rule 3.9 defines these contexts to include representing 
a client in a “negotiation or other bilateral transaction with a governmental 
agency,” “application for a license or other privilege,” “compliance with 
generally applicable reporting requirements,” and “an investigation or 
examination of the client’s affairs conducted by government investigators 
or examiners.”19  In all these situations, Comment 3 says that the rules that 
apply are the rules governing “transactions with persons other than 
clients,”20 comprising Rules 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others) to 
4.4 (Respect for the Rights of Third Persons) and, thus, apparently, not any 
of the “Advocate” rules (Rules 3.1 to 3.9) or rules governing practice before 
a “tribunal.”  From the perspective of the Model Rules, then, the primary 
issue for lawyers practicing before agencies is how many of the “advocate” 
and “tribunal” rules apply to them:  all, some, or none.21 
The tripartite approach of the Model Rules is interesting mostly because 
of the recognition and treatment of the last category:  lawyers practicing 
before agencies acting in their executive capacity.  The activity that 
comprises this category is perhaps the most common work that lawyers who 
 
 17. Comment 1 states that the type of “nonadjudicative proceeding” Rule 3.9 has in 
mind are proceedings in which the agency is “acting in a rule-making or policy-making 
capacity,” or is holding an “official hearing or meeting . . . to which the lawyer or the 
lawyer’s client is presenting evidence or argument.” Id. r. 3.9 cmts. 1, 3. 
 18. Id. r. 3.9. 
 19. Id. r. 3.9 cmt. 3.  The limitation in Comment 3 derives from ABA Opinion 93-375, a 
product of the savings and loan crisis.  That opinion found that a lawyer representing a client 
subject to a routine bank examination by a government agency was not governed by Model 
Rule 3.9 because the agency was not a “tribunal,” a term that has since been defined in 
Model Rule 1.0(m) as discussed above. See supra note 15.  That conclusion mattered 
because the mandatory disclosure obligations in Model Rule 3.3 apply only to lawyers 
practicing before a tribunal. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
93-375 (1993). 
 20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 4.1–.4. 
 21. Restatement Third on the Law Governing Lawyers, section 104(3), does not adopt 
the tripartite structure of the Model Rules, but rather draws a distinction between “an 
adjudicative proceeding before a government agency or involving such an agency as a 
participant,” in which the lawyer “has the legal rights and responsibilities of an advocate in a 
proceeding before a judicial tribunal,” and “other types of proceedings and matters,” in 
which the lawyer “has the legal rights and responsibilities applicable in the lawyer’s dealings 
with a private person.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 104(3). 
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practice before agencies do, yet the Model Rules address this work only 
indirectly, ambiguously, and in a comment.22  Moreover, the implication of 
the Model Rules is that lawyers practicing before administrative agencies 
acting in an adjudicative capacity owe more ethical duties than lawyers who 
practice before administrative agencies acting in an executive capacity, who 
tend to act in a more transactional or advisory role. 
In the two most well-known events involving lawyers practicing before 
agencies in the last thirty years—the Kaye Scholer case23 and the SEC’s 
Sarbanes-Oxley rules24 promulgated in the wake of the Enron scandal—
some in the corporate bar took what seems like the opposite perspective:  
that lawyers practicing before an administrative agency acting in its 
executive capacity should be viewed as advocates, who have fewer ethical 
restrictions, or more ethical leeway, than lawyers acting as advisers or 
counselors.25  We allow lawyers to make aggressive and creative arguments 
in litigation, knowing that there will be a lawyer on the other side to make 
counterarguments.26  Lawyers acting as advisors have less leeway in 
making creative arguments to avoid complying with the law.27  The 
corporate bar’s position has thus seemed to want to have it both ways:  
lawyers who practice before agencies can view themselves as advocates for 
the purpose of interpreting disclosure requirements narrowly, but can view 
themselves as nonadvocates for the purpose of avoiding duties to the court. 
The tripartite division of agency practice in the Model Rules leaves a 
number of questions unresolved.  First, do all the Advocate Rules apply to 
lawyers practicing before an agency acting in an adjudicatory capacity, 
even if a particular rule does not reference a “tribunal”?  The Advocate 
 
 22. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.9 cmt. 3. 
 23. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, SUSAN P. KONIAK, ROGER C. CRAMTON, GEORGE M. 
COHEN & W. BRADLEY WENDEL, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 161–63 (5th ed. 
2010). 
 24. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 205.1–.7 (2015) (Standards of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the Representation of an 
Issuer). 
 25. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 166 (1998) (stating that the 
defenders of Kaye Scholer’s actions representing Charles Keating’s savings and loan before 
the bank agency “framed the matter as litigation, and argued that in that context counsel had 
no duty to avoid misleadingly incomplete (as opposed to specifically false) representations,” 
whereas the agency “framed the matter as bank regulation and argued that in that context a 
higher duty of candor was appropriate”); Wilkins, supra note 7, at 1183–85; Susan P. 
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done:  The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1236, 1276–77 (2003) (criticizing SEC rule allowing a lawyer not to report up evidence 
of wrongdoing to a company’s board if the board has retained a lawyer who “may” assert a 
“colorable defense” as applying an inappropriate advocacy standard to a lawyer in a 
counseling role). 
 26. See generally Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak, Legal and 
Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 769–71 (2004). 
 27. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) 
(describing the different lawyer roles of advocate and adviser and stating that “[w]hile 
serving as an advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds 
of the law,” but “[i]n service the client as an adviser, a lawyer . . . should give his 
professional opinion as to what the ultimate decisions of the courts would likely be as to the 
applicable law”). 
2016] THE LAWS OF AGENCY LAWYERING 1969 
Rules use different terms (not defined in Model Rule 1.0) for the kind of 
activity that generally is performed before a tribunal.  Some of the 
Advocate Rules refer to a “proceeding,”28 a term that seems broad enough 
to encompass actions before an administrative agency acting in an 
adjudicative capacity.  Other Advocate Rules refer to “litigation.”29  Still 
others refer to “trial.”30  It is not clear whether administrative agency 
adjudications are “litigation” or “trials” within the meaning of these rules.31 
Second, and relatedly, do the Model Rules, as Comment 3 to Model Rule 
3.9 suggests, really make none of the “Lawyer As Advocate” Rules 
applicable to lawyers practicing before an agency acting in its executive 
capacity?  For example, Rule 3.6(a) (Trial Publicity) expressly refers to a 
lawyer participating in an “investigation” in addition to, and apparently 
distinct from, “litigation.”32  In addition, Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing 
Party and Counsel) includes prohibitions on destroying33 and falsifying34 
evidence, which one might think ought to apply to agency investigations.  
People certainly raised that question in light of the Arthur Andersen case,35 
in which an in-house lawyer allegedly encouraged Arthur Andersen’s 
destruction of Enron documents in the face of a likely SEC investigation, 
though no disciplinary or other action was ever brought against the 
lawyer.36 
Perhaps the ABA’s apparently more limited view of the responsibilities 
of lawyers appearing before an agency in its executive capacity is much ado 
about nothing.  Conduct not covered by the advocacy rules or the tribunal 
 
 28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 3.1, 3.3(b), 3.3(d), 3.5(b), 3.6(a). 
 29. See id. rr. 3.2, 3.6(a). 
 30. See id. rr. 3.4(e), 3.7.  The Restatement takes the position that the advocate-witness 
restrictions of Model Rule 3.7 apply to lawyers practicing before administrative agencies 
acting in their adjudicative capacity. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 108 cmt. c 
(“The advocate-witness rule applies in all contested proceedings in which a lawyer appears 
as both advocate and witness, including . . . hearings before administrative agencies.”). 
 31. The USPTO rules clear up a number of these ambiguities by substituting “tribunal” 
for one of the other terms used by the Model Rules. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.302 (2015) 
(replacing “litigation” from Model Rule 3.2); id. § 11.303(b) (replacing “adjudicative 
proceeding” from Model Rule 3.3(e)); id. § 11.304(e) (replacing “trial” from Model Rule 
3.4(b)); id. § 11.307 (replacing “trial” from Model Rule 3.7). 
 32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (“A lawyer who is participating or has 
participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial 
statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means 
of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”).  Statements in some agency investigations could 
arguably fall under this rule. 
 33. Id. r. 3.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to 
evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having 
potential evidentiary value.  A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any 
such act.”). 
 34. Id. r. 3.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to 
testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.”). 
 35. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
 36. United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 286–87 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 
544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
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rules may be covered by other rules.37  For example, consider a simple 
situation in which a lawyer knowingly submits false information to an 
agency on behalf of a client.  If the agency is acting as a “tribunal,” this 
conduct violates several of the Advocate Rules.38  If the agency is not 
acting as a “tribunal,” the same conduct could nevertheless violate several 
other rules applicable to all lawyers.39  The difference is that the Advocate 
Rules impose more specific obligations than the comparable rules for 
nonadvocates.  The fact that the drafters of the Model Rules created more 
specific duties for advocates suggests that the more general rules applicable 
to other lawyers do not include all those duties  The Model Rules 
themselves, however, give little guidance on this issue. 
Another example in which the tripartite division might not have much 
practical effect is the rule on multijurisdictional practice.40  Rule 5.5(c) 
allows lawyers licensed in one state to practice before a tribunal in a 
different state under certain conditions.41  For lawyers who practice before 
federal agencies, however, Rule 5.5(d)(2) allows all lawyers who practice 
before federal agencies to engage in multijurisdictional practice so long as 
some federal law or rule allows them to do so.42 
C.  Incorporation of Agency Ethics Rules 
Apart from specific rules addressing agency lawyering and the tripartite 
division, the Model Rules impact lawyers practicing before federal agencies 
in another way, directly tied to the theme of this Article.  Some of the 
Model Rules seem to expressly incorporate agency rules, including agency 
rules governing the conduct of lawyers practicing before those agencies.  
Most notably, Rule 3.4(c) states that a  “lawyer shall not . . . knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open 
refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”43  Because an 
 
 37. The Restatement suggests as much:  “In any event, the legal duties of an advocate in 
an adjudicative proceeding are not necessarily significantly different from or less exacting 
than those governing a lawyer functioning in a nonlitigation capacity.” RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 2, § 104 cmt. d. 
 38. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (“A lawyer shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”); id. r. 3.3(a)(3) (“A 
lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false . . . .”); id. r. 
3.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . falsify evidence . . . .”). 
 39. See id. r. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not . . . assist a client . . . in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”); id. r. 4.1(a) (“In the course of representing a client a 
lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person . . . .”); id. r. 8.4(d) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”). 
 40. Id. r. 5.5 
 41. Id. r. 5.5(c). 
 42. Id. r. 5.5(d)(2) (allowing a lawyer not licensed in a jurisdiction to provide legal 
services there if the services are ones “that the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law or 
rule to provide in this jurisdiction”). 
 43. Id. r. 3.4(c); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 105 (“In representing a 
client in a matter before a tribunal, a lawyer must comply with applicable law, including 
rules of procedure and evidence and specific tribunal rulings.”); id. § 105 cmt. b (noting that 
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administrative agency acting in an adjudicative capacity is a “tribunal” 
under the Model Rules, a lawyer can be disciplined by the lawyer’s state 
disciplinary authority under Rule 3.4(c) for violating an agency’s rules 
when it acts in that capacity, even if those rules differ from the Model Rules 
applicable to advocates.44  Moreover, Rule 3.4(c), via Rule 3.9, also applies 
to lawyers appearing before an administrative agency acting in a 
“nonadjudicative proceeding,” that is, in a legislative capacity.  Thus, the 
Model Rules apparently incorporate agency rules governing an agency’s 
conduct in this capacity as well.  On the other hand, if the lawyer practices 
before an agency acting in its executive capacity, that lawyer’s violation of 
the agency’s rules would not violate Rule 3.4(c) (though it could violate 
other ethics rules and subject the lawyer to consequences under other 
law).45 
Another rule that incorporates the rules of a tribunal is Rule 1.16(c) on 
withdrawal, which requires a lawyer to “comply with applicable law 
requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating a 
representation.”46  Thus, if an agency acting in an adjudicatory capacity has 
a rule requiring notice or permission before a lawyer can withdraw (as some 
do),47 a lawyer who fails to follow that rule would be subject to discipline 
by the relevant state ethics authorities. 
In addition, several Model Rules base their ethical obligations or 
permissions on “law,” which may include agency rules.  For example, 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits a lawyer to “reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes 
necessary . . . to comply with other law or a court order.”48  Comment 15 to 
Rule 1.6 states that the permission may apply when a lawyer is ordered to 
reveal information by a “governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to 
other law to compel the disclosure.”49  Another example is Model Rule 4.2, 
which allows lawyers to make contact with represented persons if the 
contact is “authorized . . . by law.”50  Comment 5 to Rule 4.2 suggests that 
 
“administrative agencies . . . may have rules of procedure and evidence different from those 
of courts”). 
 44. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(c). 
 45. By contrast, the Restatement states that a lawyer representing a client before an 
administrative agency “must comply with applicable law and regulations governing such 
representations.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 104(2).  The Restatement is not, 
however, limited to ethical prohibitions and so states a broader rule to alert lawyers to 
potential consequences other than state discipline for violating a federal agency’s rules. 
 46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(c). 
 47. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 12.9(c) (CFTC; notice plus permission); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 201.102(d)(4) (SEC; notice only); 29 C.F.R. § 2200.23(b) (OSHRC; notice plus 
permission). 
 48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6).  Note that the exception says “court” 
order, not order of a “tribunal,” so a question could be raised about whether an order by an 
agency acting in its adjudicative capacity falls under this exception. 
 49. Id. cmt. 15; see also Michigan State Bar Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. RI-311 (1999) 
(opining that the Code of Federal Regulations constitutes “law” for purposes of the Rule 1.6 
exception, so that compliance with an agency rule mandating disclosure would not violate 
Michigan’s Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 50. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2. 
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such communications “may include communications by a lawyer on behalf 
of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to 
communicate with the government.”51  Other Model Rules that incorporate 
other law include rules on communication,52 conflicts of interest,53 
withdrawal,54 tampering with evidence55 or witnesses,56 and impartiality of 
a tribunal.57  One argument against interpreting “law” to include agency 
regulations is that there is one Model Rule that uses both the terms “law” 
and “rule,” suggesting that the drafters view them as distinct.58 
In sum, lawyers who practice before federal agencies must comply with 
state ethics rules, typically based on the ABA Model Rules and applicable 
to all lawyers, as well as with the specific rules applicable to lawyers 
engaged in agency practice.  They also must pay attention to which function 
the agency is serving to determine which state ethics rules apply.  And they 
must consider how the agency’s own rules may impact their ethical 
obligations under the general ethics rules.  Just what those agency rules are 
and what purposes they might serve are the topics of the remaining two 
parts. 
II.  EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 
FOR FEDERAL AGENCY RULES 
State ethics rules provide an important backdrop for the federal agency 
rules regulating lawyers who appear and practice before the agencies.  
Although some of these rules predate the ABA Model Rules, many 
agencies have promulgated or revised their rules since the Model Rules first 
appeared in 1980.  Yet while the states have almost unanimously fallen in 
line behind the Model Rules, the agencies have largely gone their own 
ways.  This part examines possible reasons for these rules and their 
apparent diversity.  Looking at what is and why it might have come to be 
 
 51. Id. cmt. 5. 
 52. Id. r. 1.4(a)(5) (“A lawyer shall . . . consult with the client about any relevant 
limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance 
not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”). 
 53. Id. r. 1.7(b)(2) (allowing consent to cure a concurrent conflict of interest if, among 
other things, “the representation is not prohibited by law”). 
 54. Id. r. 1.16(a)(1) (stating that “a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from representation of a client if . . . the 
representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law”). 
 55. Id. r. 3.4(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to 
evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having 
potential evidentiary value . . . .”). 
 56. Id. r. 3.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to 
testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.”). 
 57. Id. r. 3.5(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective 
juror or other official by means prohibited by law.”); id. r. 3.5(b) (“A lawyer shall 
not . . . communicate ex parte with such a person during the proceeding unless authorized to 
do so by law or court order.”). 
 58. Id. r. 5.5(d)(2) (allowing a lawyer not licensed in a jurisdiction to provide legal 
services there if the services are ones “that the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law or 
rule to provide in this jurisdiction”). 
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can provide a more informed debate about the normative questions 
concerning the legitimacy and desirability of these rules. 
A.  Specialized Rules Tailored 
to Particular Regulatory Regimes 
One possible explanation for agency ethics rules is that an agency can 
tailor its rules to the agency’s particular subject area and practice context.59  
By contrast, the ABA’s Model Rules aim to govern all lawyers, regardless 
of the subject matter or nature of the lawyer’s practice and therefore must 
arguably be more general.60  The ABA itself has, on occasion, taken a more 
specialized approach, for example, by adopting Standards Relating to the 
Administration of Criminal Justice,61 as well as other standards on 
particular practice topics that provide more detailed guidance than the 
Model Rules do.62 
If specialized tailoring is the goal of agency rules, we would expect the 
agency rules to focus on those aspects of practice specific to a particular 
agency and the industry the agency regulates.  We might expect a big 
emphasis on issues such as competence, because the meaning of 
competence varies by practice area.  On the other hand, if the tailoring 
theory were the dominant explanation for agency rules, we would expect 
relatively few general rules that could easily apply to lawyers appearing 
before different agencies, operating in different industries, and with 
different purposes. 
B.  Rules Addressing Practice Before Agencies Generally 
A related justification for agency ethics rules is that agency practice in 
general has unique aspects that the Model Rules either do not cover or on 
which agencies’ views of lawyers’ responsibilities differ.  The argument is 
that practice before any administrative agency shares certain common 
features that necessitate separate rules. 
 
 59. See Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 2, at 132 (“Representation before agencies 
also involves particular practice context, so that agency-level regulation tailors the 
professional regulation to reflect the unique aspects of the practice setting.”); see also id. at 
147 (noting that agency practice rules reflect federal norms that complement state 
regulations in areas of unique federal interest). 
 60. The Model Rules do not follow this principle absolutely.  In addition to Rule 3.9, 
discussed supra notes 9–11, 17–22, see Rules 1.11 (conflict of interest rule for former and 
current government lawyers), 1.12 (conflict of interest rule for former judges), 1.13 (special 
rule for lawyer representing organizations, including government lawyers), 2.4 (special rule 
for lawyer serving as a third-party neutral), and 3.8 (special rule for prosecutors) for other 
exceptions. 
 61. AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE (1992). 
 62. See, e.g., STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING VICTIMS OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING IN CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER CASES 
(2007); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS REPRESENTING A CHILD IN ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT CASES (1996). 
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As discussed in the previous part,63 the Model Rules identify three types 
of agency conduct and then determine which rules apply to which type of 
conduct.  Roughly speaking, the Model Rules divide the lawyering world 
into litigation lawyers and transactional lawyers.  Lawyers practicing before 
agencies acting in their executive capacity, however, do not fall squarely 
within either of these traditional practice paradigms.  Perhaps the main 
activity agencies do is compel the production of information, the raw 
material that agencies in turn use to create, modify, or enforce regulations.  
Regulated persons and entities must provide this information, often with the 
assistance of their lawyers.  Advocate lawyers and their clients are also 
compelled to provide information, but only in the limited context of an 
adversary proceeding, supervised by a court, concerning a specifically 
alleged wrong that generally has already occurred.  Transactional lawyers 
and their clients generally are not compelled to provide any information, 
though they often do so voluntarily, and in doing so they must not lie to 
others or otherwise engage in fraud.  Agencies compelling the production of 
general information about ongoing activities absent any accusation of 
wrongdoing fall somewhere in between these paradigms. 
If agency rules aim to address the unique aspects of agency practice, we 
should expect to see relative uniformity across agency rules and a focus on 
topics such as investigations.  On the other hand, we might expect to see 
fewer rules addressing areas of practice common to all lawyers, such as 
rules governing the lawyer-client relationship, because these do not 
implicate the unique features and institutional interests of agencies. 
C.  Uniform Rules for Nonlawyers 
and Lawyers Who Practice Before an Agency 
One common justification for agency rules regulating lawyers is that 
many agencies allow specified nonlawyers to represent people before 
them.64  This justification breaks down into two parts.  First, because 
nonlawyers are not otherwise regulated, agencies need to do it to ensure that 
these nonlawyer practitioners act appropriately.  Second, if agencies are 
going to regulate the nonlawyers who practice before them, the same 
standards should apply to both lawyers and nonlawyers providing the same 
services. 
Both of these rationales can be questioned.  With respect to the first, 
nonlawyer representatives generally act as agents of the regulated people 
they are representing; thus, they are regulated by the common law of 
agency, which covers much of the same ground as ethics rules.65  They are 
 
 63. See supra Part I.A. 
 64. See Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 2, at 132 & n.51 (quoting BERNARD 
WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 6 (4th ed. 2008)). 
 65. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON AGENCY (AM. LAW INST. 2000).  An agent 
is anyone who acts on behalf of someone else, subject to that person’s control, and with that 
person’s consent. See id. 
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also subject to other general law, such as tort, contract, and criminal law.66  
Administrative agencies may nevertheless find this other law inadequate (as 
state bar organizations have in promulgating lawyer ethics rules), either 
because the standards are not demanding or definitive enough, or because 
enforcing agency law through liability and criminal sanction may be 
excessively difficult and costly for clients or agencies. 
With respect to the second rationale, the question is what purpose 
uniformity of standards for lawyer and nonlawyer representatives is 
supposed to serve.  If the purpose is to provide some minimum standard of 
behavior to protect clients and the agency, then it is not clear why 
uniformity is necessary.  So long as the lawyer’s state ethical standards 
meet or exceed the minimum set by the agency, there is no obvious need to 
apply the agency’s rules to the lawyers.  One reason to allow nonlawyer 
practitioners to represent people before an agency may be to provide a 
lower-cost alternative to clients.  Clients who prefer the supposedly higher 
quality service that lawyers provide can opt for that.  The real purpose of 
uniformity may be the opposite, however:  to impose a stricter set of rules 
on the nonlawyers to protect lawyers from a competitive disadvantage 
relative to the nonlawyer practitioners.  If that is the purpose, then we might 
expect the agency rules to apply essentially all of a lawyer’s ethical 
obligations to the nonlawyer.  A final reason for uniformity might be that 
the lawyer ethics rules are inadequate, so that both lawyers and nonlawyers 
need to be brought up to the “higher” agency standard of conduct. 
D.  Inadequate State Ethics Rule Enforcement 
Another potential reason for agency ethics rules is that state disciplinary 
authorities may lack the expertise or resources (or both) to discipline 
lawyers who practice before federal agencies.67  Agencies are experts in 
their own rules and governing statutes, whereas state disciplinary 
authorities cannot staff themselves with lawyers expert in all areas of legal 
practice.  Moreover, the resource constraints of state disciplinary authorities 
are well-known. 
If this rationale predominates, we might expect to see little deviation 
from state ethics rules.  In particular, because the main concern is 
inadequate enforcement, not substance, agency rules might simply 
 
 66. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (bribery of public officials and witnesses); id. 
§ 1001 (false statements to government agencies); id. § 1505 (obstruction of justice in 
proceedings before agencies); id. § 1512 (tampering with witnesses or evidence); id. § 1519 
(destruction of records in agency investigations). 
 67. See Coquillette & McMorrow, supra note 2, at 147–48 (stating that agency ethics 
enforcement “generally addresses areas of attorney conduct that are neglected by state 
regulators”); Cox, supra note 4, at 179 n.22 (quoting ABA STANDING COMM. ON PROF’L 
DISCIPLINE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (1980)); id. at 179 n.23 (quoting a letter 
from SEC officials to the ABA concerning proposals regarding agency discipline of 
lawyers); Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of 
Lawyers, 2003 PROF. LAW. 15, 30–31 (suggesting that increased regulation of lawyers by 
agencies may “reflect a broad perception that traditional state regulation of lawyers is failing 
and that nontraditional regulators should enter the field”). 
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incorporate the state ethics rules of each lawyer’s home jurisdiction.  To the 
extent that agency rules deviate from state rules, we might expect to find 
more agency rules governing areas that are more legally or factually 
complex. 
E.  Multijurisdictional Practice Issues 
Lawyers who practice before federal agencies might not practice in the 
jurisdiction in which they are licensed.68  In particular, lawyers who work 
in Washington, D.C., and practice full time before federal agencies may be 
licensed in another jurisdiction, yet are permitted to practice in D.C.69  
These lawyers are not subject to discipline by the D.C. authorities.70  They 
are subject to discipline in the jurisdictions in which they are licensed, but, 
for reasons stated in the previous section,71 such discipline may be unlikely 
against lawyers living and working outside the jurisdiction. 
Lawyers practicing before federal agencies in D.C. are licensed in a 
variety of jurisdictions.  One might expect that agencies would want to 
apply the same rules to all lawyers who practice before them.  Doing so 
would reduce enforcement costs for agencies that would not have to 
become familiar with multiple sets of ethics rules.  Although the aspiration 
of the ABA Model Rules is that states will adopt them without change, 
many states modify the ABA Model Rules.  Agencies that sought to achieve 
uniformity for these reasons could do so in several ways.  They could hew 
closely to the ABA Model Rules so as to be neutral with respect to 
particular state variations.  Or agencies could use the D.C. Rules as a 
 
 68. See Cox, supra note 4, at 178, 179 (arguing that “if the states effectively processed 
allegations of attorney misconduct before federal agencies, federal disciplinary actions 
arguably would be unnecessary”). 
 69. Rule 49 of the D.C. Court of Appeals Rules (“the D.C. Rules”) exempts from the 
prohibition on unauthorized practice of law lawyers who 
[p]rovid[e] legal services to members of the public solely before a special court, 
department or agency of the United States, where: 
(A) Such legal services are confined to representation before such fora and 
other conduct reasonably ancillary to such representation; 
(B) Such conduct is authorized by statute, or the special court, department or 
agency has adopted a rule expressly permitting and regulating such 
practice; and 
(C) If the practitioner has an office in the District of Columbia, the 
practitioner expressly gives prominent notice in all business documents 
of the practitioner’s bar status and that his or her practice is limited 
consistent with this section (c). 
RULES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS r. 49(c) (2015).  As discussed in 
the previous section, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, Model Rule 5.5(d)(2) adopts 
a similar permission for “services that the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law or rule 
to provide in this jurisdiction,” but the D.C. Rules do not include this provision;  instead, the 
comment to D.C. Rule 5.5 references Rule 49. Id. r. 5.5 cmt. 1. 
 70. D.C. Rule 8.5(a), which sets forth the D.C. disciplinary authority, does not extend 
this authority to lawyers licensed outside of D.C. but practicing in D.C.  By contrast, ABA 
Model Rule 8.5(a) provides:  “A lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also subject to the 
disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide any legal 
services in this jurisdiction.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.5(a). 
 71. See supra Part II.D. 
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model, as that is the jurisdiction in which most federal agencies are 
headquartered.  Or agencies could just adopt their own rules.  But any of 
these approaches potentially creates difficult choice of law problems for 
lawyers whose state ethics rules differ from the federal agency rules.72 
Agencies may, however, use their own ethics rules to restrict, rather than 
expand, the ability of lawyers to engage in multijurisdictional practice.  In 
particular, agencies may seek to engage in reciprocal discipline, in which 
agencies restrict practice by lawyers who have already been disciplined 
elsewhere.  If that is the main concern, agencies need not have uniform 
rules, or any substantive ethics rules, but simply can rely on the various 
state authorities disciplining lawyers under their own rules. 
F.  Private Lawyer Interests 
Agency rules may reflect the interests of the lawyers who practice before 
the agencies rather than the interests of agencies.  Agency rules created 
under this theory could be benign and desirable; for example, they could 
help create or maintain a close-knit community of practitioners, like a 
specialized bar.  Alternatively, agency rules could reflect self-interested 
capture of an agency by lawyers who practice before it.  One might expect 
smaller bars with extensive repeated interactions with agencies to have 
greater influence on those agency rules.73 
It may be difficult, however, to discern whether agency rules reflect 
lawyer interests and whether these interests are benign or malign.  Some 
rules could on their face appear to serve lawyer interests more than an 
agency’s interest or the public interest.  On the other hand, if agency ethics 
rules aim to respond to capture concerns—for example, rules governing 
revolving door conflicts or other forms of undue influence—the existence 
of such rules might suggest that the malign version of agency rules is less 
likely.74 
G.  Experimentation in Ethical Regulation 
We are used to thinking of states as the laboratories of democracy in our 
federal system.  The significant variation in the state versions of the Model 
Rules is consistent with this view.75  Nevertheless, agencies may feel less 
constrained by the ABA prototype than states do, and therefore they may 
feel freer to experiment, even if none of the justifications discussed above 
applies.  Under this rationale, we might expect to find variations that do not 
fall within the above categories, but simply reflect an agency’s view of 
desirable ethics rules. 
 
 72. But see Coquillete & McMorrow, supra note 2, at 148 (concluding that choice of law 
issues seem to be “manageable”). 
 73. Professors Coquillette and McMorrow suggest that the capture problem may in fact 
be bigger for the state ethics rules than for agency-created rules. Id. at 148–49. 
 74. See id. at 132–33. 
 75. See Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 373–76 
(1994) (analyzing the argument that respecting state professional regulation “enables the 
states to serve as laboratories for novel approaches”). 
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H.  History and Experience 
Finally, agency ethics rules may arise and exhibit variety simply because 
agencies have different histories and experiences.  As I tell my students, law 
is the fossilized remains of prior misbehavior.  Agency rules may simply 
reflect an agency’s experiences with lawyers practicing before it, which 
may not have anything to do with agency practice generally or an agency’s 
particular subject matter context.  Although one might expect a highly 
public scandal involving lawyers practicing before one agency to influence 
other agencies’ rules, agencies may, rightly or wrongly, see problems faced 
by other agencies as unique to those agencies’ particular circumstances. 
III.  AN EXAMINATION OF RULES GOVERNING LAWYERS 
PRACTICING BEFORE FEDERAL AGENCIES 
This part offers a preliminary examination of federal agency ethics rules.  
It begins with some general observations about these rules and then 
evaluates the theories presented in the previous part based on the rules that 
exist. I find some support for most of the theories, but no single theory 
explains all or most of the existing rules. 
A.  General Observations 
Forty-six agencies that have rules published in the Code of Federal 
Regulations have at least one ethics rule governing lawyers who practice 
before the agency.76  Rules appear in twenty-six of the fifty titles of the 
Code of Federal Regulations.77  The agencies steadily have adopted these 
rules over a period stretching from 1958 to 2014, with no more than a four-
year gap from the adoption of one set of rules to the adoption of the next, 
with no year having more than three adoptions, and with most years having 
no more than one.78  The most common topics covered by the rules are 
disruptive conduct (twenty-seven agencies), ex parte contact with agency 
officials (twenty-six),79 incorporation of state ethics duties (twenty-five), 
frivolous claims (twenty), required compliance with agency rules 
(nineteen), and obstruction of justice (eighteen).  This list is striking.  Only 
the first three of these rules have been adopted by a majority of agencies 
having at least one ethics rule, and no ethics rules outside this list are 
adopted by one-third or more of the agencies having at least one rule.  The 
vast majority of rules apply to lawyers practicing before an agency acting in 
 
 76. See infra APPENDIX A for an alphabetical list.  The rules are not easy to locate, and 
classification is subject to interpretation, so I may have missed some.  A spreadsheet I 
created containing all the agency rules I could find and matching them up to the ABA Model 
rules is available on the Fordham Law Review website at http://fordhamlawreview.org/gmc/. 
 77. See infra APPENDIX B. 
 78. See infra APPENDIX D. 
 79. The Administrative Procedure Act bars ex parte communications with agency 
decision makers, but the remedy is limited to dismissal of the claim. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 557 
(d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(O) (2012).  Although agencies typically have rules against ex parte contact 
with agency officials, I included only those agencies whose rules specifically provide for 
some form of discipline against lawyers who violate the rule. 
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its judicial capacity.  Although the content of these rules does not vary 
greatly when an agency includes them, which agencies include which rules 
varies significantly, with no readily apparent pattern.  In addition, the 
organizational structure and labeling of agency rules varies dramatically.80 
Only two sets of agency rules track the format and scope of the Model 
Rules:  the USPTO Rules of Professional Conduct81 and the Judge 
Advocate General (JAG), Department of the Navy, Rules of Professional 
Conduct.82  Even these rules do not include the comments from the Model 
Rules; in fact, no agency rules include comments.83  Eight other agencies 
have relatively comprehensive and detailed lawyer practice rules not 
generally patterned on the Model Rules:  Executive Office of Immigration 
Review84 (EOIR), Department of Homeland Security85 (DHS), Department 
of Transportation (DOT), Aviation Proceedings,86 Social Security 
Administration87 (SSA), IRS,88 Veterans Administration (VA), Surface 
Transportation Board89 (STB) (formerly Interstate Commerce 
Commission), and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF).  The 
SEC has a detailed set of rules promulgated under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
statute, but these rules cover a limited number of topics.90 
The agencies regulating banks also have significant rules governing 
lawyers who practice before the agencies, but they do not separate out those 
rules, identify them as rules of professional conduct or similar 
nomenclature, or collect all the rules in one place, making them difficult to 
find if one does not know where to look.  These agencies are:  the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation91 (FDIC), the Office of Thrift Supervision92 
(OTS), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency93 (OCC), the National 
 
 80. See infra APPENDIX C.  The most common term identifying the rules is “Rules of 
Practice” (fifteen agencies), followed by “Professional Conduct” (five), “Rules of 
Procedure” (three) and “Rules of Conduct” (two).  But fewer than half of the agencies with 
rules use one or more of these terms to label their rules, including the IRS, which has one of 
the most detailed sets of rules. 
 81. 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.101–.111 (2015).  For a complete list of the agencies discussed in 
this Article and their respective abbreviations, see infra APPENDIX A. 
 82. 32 C.F.R. §§ 776.18–.71 (2015). 
 83. The JAG Rules do contain preamble and principles sections, loosely related to the 
Model Rules preamble and scope sections. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 776.18–.19; cf. 49 C.F.R. 
§ 1103.10 (2015) (“Introduction” to STB rules, providing that the rules do not relieve a 
lawyer from other applicable ethical duties). 
 84. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 (2015). 
 85. Id. § 292.3(b).  The DHS Rules simply incorporate the EOIR Rules, which is 
explained by the fact that both agencies split off from INS.  I count them as separate 
agencies in this discussion but refer only to EOIR when giving examples. 
 86. 14 C.F.R. §§ 300.1–.20 (2015). 
 87. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740 (2015). 
 88. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22–.38 (2015) (Circular 230). 
 89. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1103.10–.35.  These rules are based to some extent on the ABA’s 
former Canons of Professional Ethics. 
 90. 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1–.7 (2015). 
 91. 12 C.F.R. §§ 308.6(b)–.9, 308.108–.109, 390.355(b) (2015). 
 92. Id. §§ 509.6(b)–.9, 513.4(a), 563.180(b). 
 93. Id. §§ 19.6(b)–.9, 109.6(b)–.9, 19.183(e), 163.180(b).  For some reason, the OCC 
has two identical sets of Uniform Rules of Practice and Procedure. 
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Credit Union Administration94 (NCUA), and the Federal Reserve Board95 
(FRB).  With respect to adjudicative proceedings, the banking agencies 
have adopted “Uniform Rules of Practice and Procedure,” which serve as 
the equivalent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure96 (FRCP).  These 
Uniform Rules cover topics found in the ABA Model Rules, such as rules 
on disruptive or obstructionist conduct, frivolous claims, conflicts of 
interest, and ex parte communications with officials.97  The placement of 
these rules within rules of procedure, which occurs in other agencies as well 
as the banking agencies, shows that agencies do not necessarily follow the 
division of territory normally observed between rules of civil procedure and 
ethics rules.98  With respect to their nonadjudicative capacities, the banking 
agencies do not have uniform ethics rules, and the ethics rules they have are 
listed under different topic headings, such as “Practice Before the 
[Agency]” or “Formal Investigations.”99 
Agency rules leave out a large number of topics covered in the state 
ethics rules.  Some of the omitted topics simply reflect the more limited 
scope of lawyer practice before the agency.  For example, no agency rules 
address criminal practice, with the exception of the JAG Rules, which apply 
to courts martial.100  In addition, none of the agencies’ rules include any 
rules similar to the Public Service Rules found in Model Rules 6.1 to 6.5.  
And none of the agencies’ rules includes Model Rule 7.6 on Political 
Contributions to Obtain Government Legal Engagements or Appointments 
 
 94. Id. §§ 747.6(b)–.9; id. § 747.807(d). 
 95. Id. §§ 263.6(b)–.9.  Other rules governing lawyers located in Title 12 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations, which houses almost a quarter of the agencies having ethics rules (more 
than any other Title), include those of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, id. §§ 1209.13–
.14, §§ 1209.73–.74; the Farm Credit Administration, id. §§ 622.3(b), 622.7(j), 
622.105(d)(2); and the recently created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, id. 
§§ 1081.107–.110. 
 96. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 19.1–.41, 109.1–.41 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 263.1–.41 (FRB); 12 
C.F.R. §§ 308.1–.41 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 509.1–.41 (OTS); 12 C.F.R. §§ 747.1–.41 
(NCUA). 
 97. For the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, these rules are 12 C.F.R. §§ 19.8, 
109.8 (conflicts of interest); 12 C.F.R. §§ 19.7, 109.7 (frivolous claims); 12 C.F.R. §§ 19.9, 
109.9 (ex parte contact); 12 C.F.R. §§ 19.6(b), 109.6(b) (disruptive conduct). 
 98. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not, for example, have a rule about conflicts 
of interest in litigation.  Law governing that topic is left to the ethics rules and the courts’ 
rulings on disqualification motions.  Nor do the Federal Rules have a rule on disruptive or 
obstructionist conduct or ex parte communications, both of which are included in state ethics 
rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 (b) (ex parte contact), id. r. 3.5(d) 
(disruptive conduct).  On the other hand, Federal Rule 11 and Model Rule 3.1 both address 
the issue of frivolous claims in similar ways, and both sets of rules cover some other topics, 
such as discovery abuse. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (discovery abuse); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1; id. r. 3.4(d) (discovery abuse).  The federal agency rules on 
frivolous claims tend to track the language of Rule 11 rather than Model Rule 3.1. See, e.g., 
37 C.F.R. § 11.301 (2015) (USPTO, tracking FED. R. CIV. P. 11). But see 32 C.F.R. § 776.40 
(2015) (JAG, tracking Model Rule 3.1). 
 99. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. §§ 263.91–.94 (FRB, Practice Before the Board); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 513.4(a) (OTS, Practice Before the Office); 12 CFR § 563.180(b) (OTS); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 19.183(e) (OCC, Formal Investigations, Rights of Witnesses). 
 100. See 32 C.F.R. § 776.47. 
2016] THE LAWS OF AGENCY LAWYERING 1981 
by Judges, as agencies generally do not engage in retaining or appointing 
private lawyers. 
The USPTO and JAG Rules, which track the Model Rules (with 
significant modifications), include versions of all the other Model Rules, 
though in some cases only one of these two agencies includes a particular 
rule.  The topics of many of those rules, however, are not included in the 
rules of any other agency.101  Even Rule 3.9, which specifically addresses 
lawyers appearing before agencies acting in nonadjudicative contexts, 
appears in only one other agency’s rules.102  A number of other topics 
covered by the Model Rules appear in the rules of no more than four 
agencies, including all the rules on Information About Legal Services, but 
also such significant topics as successive conflicts of interest, the No-
Contact Rule (the rule that prohibits certain contact with represented 
persons, not the rule that prohibits contact with agency personnel), and the 
duty to report misconduct.103  It is particularly noteworthy that apart from 
the SEC’s Sarbanes-Oxley Rules (and the USPTO and JAG Rules), no 
other agency has a rule on the responsibilities of lawyers for an 
organization, including the up-the-ladder reporting obligation, even though 
several financially oriented agencies have adopted rules since Sarbanes-
Oxley (i.e., FHFA, OCC, and Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection 
(BCFP)). 
B.  How Agency Rules Reflect the 
Justifications for Agency Regulation 
In light of this hodgepodge, it should not be surprising that no single 
theory explains all of the agency rules.  Nor does one explanation 
predominate.  In many cases, more than one rationale seems applicable.  
Different theories better explain rules in different agencies, though the 
reason for the differences between agencies is not always apparent.  This 
section examines the extent to which agency rules governing lawyers reflect 
the previously identified justifications. 
 
 101. The Model Rules that appear in some form in either the USPTO Rules or the JAG 
Rules but are not in any other agency rules (that I could find) are:  1.12 (conflicts of interest 
for former judges), 1.14 (clients with diminished capacity), 1.17 (sale of a law practice) 
(USPTO only), 1.18 (duties to prospective clients) (USPTO only), 2.3 (opinion letters), 2.4 
(lawyer as third-party neutral), 3.7 (lawyer as witness), 3.8 (duties of a prosecutor) (JAG 
only), 5.6 (restrictions on the right to practice) (USPTO only), 5.7 (law-related services) 
(USPTO only), 8.2 (statements about judges), and 8.5 (choice of law) (JAG only). 
 102. 10 C.F.R. § 2.1509 (2015) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission). 
 103. The rules (apart from those mentioned in the previous footnote) whose topics are not 
addressed in more than four agencies (including USPTO and JAG) are:  Rules 1.0 
(definitions), 1.8 (transactional conflicts), 1.9 (successive conflicts), 1.10 (imputation of 
conflicts of interest), 1.13 (organizational clients), 2.1 (lawyer as advisor), 3.6 (trial 
publicity), 3.9 (nonadjudicative proceedings), 4.2 (no-contact rule), 4.3 (dealing with 
unrepresented persons), 4.4 (respect for the rights of third persons), 5.2 (subordinate lawyer), 
5.3 (nonlawyer assistants), 5.4 (independence of lawyer), 7.2 (advertising), 7.5 (firm names 
and letterheads), 8.1 (bar admission), and 8.3 (reporting misconduct). 
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1.  Specialization and Competence 
Some agency rules are tailored to specialized areas of practice.  For 
example, the USPTO rule on competence adds that lawyers (and nonlawyer 
practitioners) practicing before that agency must have “scientific and 
technical knowledge” necessary for the representation,104 an obvious 
necessity for patent practice.  In addition, the immigration agencies (EOIR 
and DHS) are unique in requiring that lawyers make reasonable efforts to 
communicate with a client in the client’s native language, a particularly apt 
requirement for lawyers handling immigration cases.  The SSA details the 
assistance a practitioner must provide to a claimant for benefits in providing 
certain evidence to the agency,105 which may reflect the fact that the 
claimants before that agency are individuals who are generally mentally or 
physically disabled or elderly and so likely need extra assistance in 
gathering information.  The IRS’s Circular 230 Rules include detailed 
requirements for lawyers assisting clients with tax returns or drafting tax 
opinions.106  The JAG confidentiality rule includes a mandatory disclosure 
provision for situations in which a lawyer “reasonably believes” such 
disclosure is “necessary to prevent . . . significant impairment of national 
security or the readiness or capability of a military unit, vessel, aircraft, or 
weapon system.”107 
Most agency rules, however, neither tailor their rules to the agency’s area 
of expertise, nor require lawyers to have any particular nonlegal expertise 
related to the agency’s function.  Perhaps most striking, many agencies with 
ethics rules do not include a competence rule.  Those that do108 generally 
track the language of Model Rule 1.1,109 sometimes (in addition to adding 
supplemental requirements, as discussed in the previous paragraph) 
incorporating language from that rule’s comments,110 or adding the 
requirement that a practitioner must have knowledge of the agency’s 
governing statute and regulations, which would seem to go without saying 
(at least for lawyers).111 
 
 104. 37 C.F.R. § 11.101 (2015). 
 105. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(2) (2015). 
 106. See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.22, 10.34(d), 10.37 (2015). 
 107. 32 C.F.R. § 776.25(a)(2) (2015); see also id. § 776.25(b) (elaborating on the type of 
information that must be disclosed). 
 108. I found seven agencies with some kind of competence rule:  8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(o) 
(2015) (EOIR, DHS); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1740(a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3)(i) (SSA); 10 C.F.R. 
§§ 10.22, 10.33(a)(2), 10.34(d), 10.35, 10.37 (2015) (IRS); 32 C.F.R. § 776.20 (JAG); 11 
C.F.R. §§ 11.101, 11.18 (2015) (USPTO); 38 C.F.R. § 14.632(b)(1) (2015) (VA). 
 109. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 110. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(o) (EOIR).  The rule adds to the text derived from 
Model Rule 1.1 the first sentence of Comment 5 to that rule, which states:  “Competent 
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal 
elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of 
competent practitioners.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt 5. 
 111. See 38 C.F.R. § 14.632(b)(1) (stating that competence for lawyers practicing before 
the VA “includes understanding the issues of fact and law relevant to the claim as well as the 
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In addition, many agency rules that at first blush seem to fit the 
specialization mold could, in fact, be adopted by other agencies.  For 
example, the SEC Sarbanes-Oxley Rules largely expand on the up-the-
ladder reporting obligation found in Model Rule 1.13,112 which applies 
beyond the securities law context.  Other than specifying securities law 
violations as triggering the lawyer’s obligations, very little in the SEC 
Rules seems uniquely tailored to securities law practice.  Similarly, the duty 
of inquiry imposed by the IRS’s Circular 230 could easily fit other practice 
areas.113 
2.  Agency Uniqueness and Tripartite Structure 
Some agency rules reflect the unique features of agencies in general 
rather than the specialized areas in which agencies operate, though not as 
much as one might expect.  For example, one might expect that, given the 
tripartite structure of the Model Rules and the more detailed obligations 
they impose on lawyers practicing before an agency acting in its 
adjudicative capacity, agency rules would focus more on the agencies’ 
legislative and executive capacities. 
Some agencies do have rules applying to their executive role, in 
particular rules governing agency investigations and the submission of 
information to the agencies, but not many.  The IRS is unique in adopting a 
prohibition against “frivolous” positions in documents filed outside of 
litigation.114  In addition, the IRS,115 USPTO,116 and SSA117 all contain 
 
applicable provisions of Title 38, United States Code, and Title 38, Code of Federal 
Regulations”).  Somewhat ironically, such competence would be necessary to find this rule 
itself. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(3)(i) (stating that competence for a lawyer practicing 
before the SSA includes “knowing the significant issue(s) in a claim and having a working 
knowledge of the applicable provisions of the Social Security Act, as amended, the 
regulations and the Rulings”). 
 112. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13(b). 
 113. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.22(a)(2)–(3) (2015) (requiring a practitioner to exercise “due 
diligence . . . in determining the correctness of oral or written representations made by the 
practitioner” to the Treasury Department or IRS); 31 C.F.R. § 10.37(a)(2)(ii)–(iii) (requiring 
a practitioner providing written advice to “reasonably consider all relevant facts and 
circumstances that the practitioner knows or reasonably should know” and to “use 
reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts relevant to written advice on each 
Federal tax matter”). 
 114. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b)(1) (“A practitioner may not advise a client to take a position on 
a document, affidavit or other paper submitted to the Internal Revenue Service unless the 
position is not frivolous.”); id. § 10.34(b)(2)(ii) (“A practitioner may not advise a client to 
submit a document, affidavit or other paper to the Internal Revenue Service . . . [t]hat is 
frivolous . . . .”). 
 115. Id. §§ 10.22, 10.34(d). 
 116. 37 C.F.R. § 11.18(b)(2) (2015).  Note that this rule is not included in the USPTO’s 
general rules of professional conduct.  For a discussion of the requirements of this Rule, see 
Brandee N. Woolard, The Resurrection of the Duty to Inquire After Therasense, Inc. v. 
Becton, Dickenson & Co., 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 41 (2014). 
 117. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(1) (2015) (stating that a representative must “[a]ct with 
reasonable promptness to obtain the information and evidence that the claimant wants to 
submit in support of his or her claim, and forward the information or evidence to us for 
consideration as soon as practicable”). 
1984 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
express duties of inquiry that apply something like the FRCP 11 standard 
outside of the litigation context.  The great majority of agency rules, 
however, deal with lawyers’ duties to an agency acting in its adjudicative 
role, the subject covered most extensively by the Model Rules.  Moreover, 
apart from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission118 (NRC), JAG,119 and the 
USPTO,120 none of the agencies have rules specifically addressing a 
lawyer’s obligations when practicing before an agency acting in its 
rulemaking capacity.121 
One reason agencies do not adopt rules addressing lawyers who practice 
before the agency in its executive role may be that the agencies believe they 
lack statutory authority to do so.  Several recent court decisions have 
highlighted this issue and thrown into doubt the IRS’s authority to regulate 
lawyers outside the adjudicatory context under Circular 230.  In Loving v. 
IRS,122 the D.C. Circuit held that the IRS could not regulate nonprofessional 
tax preparers under its Circular 230 Rules because they do not “practice” 
before the agency.  The only nonadjudicative context the court recognized 
as “practice” was an “investigation.”123  Subsequently, a federal district 
court extended the Loving holding to tax professionals such as lawyers.124  
How far those opinions extend in the IRS context and beyond currently is 
uncertain.125 
Other agency rules extend lawyer obligations beyond those imposed by 
the Model Rules in ways that reflect the concerns of agencies in general.  
For example, one of the most common types of agency rule requires 
practitioners to comply with agency rules.126  These rules extend beyond 
the requirements of the Model Rules, which expressly require lawyers to 
obey agency rules only if the agency acts as a “tribunal.”127  Similarly, 
Model Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from aiding and abetting only a 
 
 118. 10 C.F.R. § 2.1509 (2015). 
 119. 32 C.F.R. § 776.48 (2015). 
 120. 37 C.F.R. § 11.309. 
 121. The CFTC allows a lawyer to be disciplined who has “engaged in unethical or 
improper professional conduct either in the course of any adjudicatory, investigative or 
rulemaking or other proceeding before the Commission or otherwise.” 17 C.F.R. § 14.8 
(2015). 
 122. 742 F.3d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 123. See id. at 1018. 
 124. Ridgely v. Lew, 55 F. Supp. 3d 89, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 125. See Jaime P. Hopkins, Loving v. IRS:  The IRS’s Achilles’ Heel for Regulated Tax 
Advice?, 34 VA. TAX REV. 191, 222–23 (2014). 
 126. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 263.91, 263.94(h) (2015) (FRB); id. § 308.108(a)(3) (FDIC); id. 
§ 513.4(a)(4) (OTS); id. § 1209.74 (FHFA); 13 C.F.R. § 134.219(a)(2) (2015) (SBA); 16 
C.F.R. § 1025.66(b) (2015) (CPSC); 17 C.F.R. § 14.4 (2015) (CFTC); id. 
§ 201.102(e)(1)(iii) (SEC); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1740 (a)(2), (c)(9) (2015) (SSA); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 18.23(a)(1)(iii) (2015) (DOL); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b)(2)(iii) (2015) (IRS); 32 C.F.R. 
§ 776.42(a)(1)(v) (2015) (JAG); 40 C.F.R. § 27.29(a)(1) (2015) (EPA); 48 C.F.R. 
§ 6101.33(a) (2015) (CBCA); 49 C.F.R. § 1103.27(f) (2015) (STB).  The immigration 
agencies have a rule limited to requiring lawyers to follow the agencies’ rule on signing and 
completing a Notice of Entry of Appearance. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(t) (2015) (EOIC, DHS). 
 127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(c) (“A lawyer shall not . . . knowingly 
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an 
assertion that no valid obligations exists.”). 
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client’s “conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent,”128 
whereas agencies that include an aiding and abetting rule often include 
regulatory or statutory violations.129  These violations may not count as 
crimes or frauds within the meaning of Model Rule 1.2(d).  Moreover, in 
some cases, the agency aiding and abetting rules omit a scienter standard or 
(in the case of the IRS) specify a recklessness or gross incompetence 
standard, which is less demanding than the “knowledge” scienter required 
for an aiding and abetting violation under Model Rule 1.2(d). 
One might expect that agencies would act aggressively to impose 
disclosure obligations on lawyers to further their public missions, which 
require detailed and accurate information from regulated parties.  In fact, 
only a few agencies impose affirmative mandatory disclosure provisions on 
lawyers in the absence of a specific request by the agency.  The USPTO 
requires practitioners to “disclose to the Office information necessary to 
comply with applicable duty of disclosure provisions.”130  The IRS Circular 
230 Rules require that practitioners “promptly submit records or 
information in any matter before the Internal Revenue Service unless the 
practitioner believes in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the 
records or information are privileged”131 and “provide[s] any information 
the practitioner has concerning [an] alleged violation [of the regulations in 
this part], unless the practitioner believes in good faith and on reasonable 
 
 128. Id. r. 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent . . . .”). 
 129. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 263.94(a) (FRB) (stating that the Board may discipline an 
individual for “[w]illfully or recklessly violating or willfully or recklessly aiding and 
abetting the violation of any provision of the Federal banking or applicable securities laws or 
the rules and regulations thereunder or conviction of any offense involving dishonesty or 
breach of trust”); id. § 308.109(a)(1)(iii) (FDIC) (stating that a lawyer can be disciplined if 
found to “have engaged in, or aided and abetted, a material and knowing violation of the 
FDIA”); id. § 513.4(a)(4) (OTS) (stating that a lawyer can be disciplined if found to “have 
willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of, any provision of the laws 
administered by the Office or the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder”); 14 C.F.R. 
§ 300.6(d) (2015) (DOT) (stating that a practitioner before the DOT should “[a]dvise all 
clients to avoid improprieties and to obey the law as the attorney believes it to be”); 17 
C.F.R. § 14.4 (CFTC) (stating that the agency may discipline any person found “to have 
violated, caused, or aided and abetted any violation of the Commodity Exchange Act . . . or 
the rules and regulations adopted thereunder”); id. § 201.102(e)(1)(iii) (SEC Rule 102(e)) 
(stating that the SEC can discipline a lawyer if the lawyer is found to have “willfully aided 
and abetted the violation of any provision of the Federal securities laws or the rules and 
regulations thereunder”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(c)(11) (SSA) (stating that a representative 
must not “[a]dvise any claimant or beneficiary not to comply with any of our rules or 
regulations”); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (2015) (IRS) (stating “[a] practitioner may not 
willfully, recklessly, or through gross incompetence” assist a taxpayer in specified conduct 
that violates the tax code, or take a position that “lacks a reasonable basis”); 49 C.F.R. 
§ 1103.31 (2015) (STB) (stating, based on the former ABA Canons, that a “practitioner 
bears the responsibility for advising as to questionable transactions, bringing questionable 
proceedings, or urging questionable defenses”).  As this list makes clear, the aiding and 
abetting standards vary greatly across agencies.  For example, the FRB, OTS, CFTC, SEC, 
and IRS rules extend the prohibition to both statutory and regulatory violations; the SSA 
Rule applies to regulatory violations only; the FDIC rule applies to statutory violations only; 
and the DOT and STB rules are unclear. 
 130. 37 C.F.R. § 11.106(c) (2015). 
 131. 31 C.F.R. § 10.20(a)(1). 
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grounds that the information is privileged.”132  Most recently, the SSA 
revised its regulations to impose on representatives a duty to “[a]ct with 
reasonable promptness to help obtain the information or evidence that the 
claimant must submit under our regulations, and forward the information or 
evidence to us for consideration as soon as practicable.”133 
In sum, a number of agencies do have ethics rules applicable to lawyers 
appearing before the agencies acting in their executive capacity, such as 
rules concerning investigations, duties of inquiry, and aiding and abetting 
prohibitions.  The existence of these rules supports the theory that agencies 
are filling in some of the gaps left by the tripartite structure of the Model 
Rules and addressing issues uniquely relevant to agency practice generally.  
Nevertheless, fewer agencies have such rules than one might anticipate and 
the rules that agencies do adopt vary widely.  Thus, this theory is only 
partially successful in explaining the existence and variety of agency rules. 
3.  Nonlawyer Practitioners 
The vast majority of agencies with rules for representatives who practice 
before the agency allow nonlawyer as well as lawyer practitioners and 
apply the same rules to both.  That fact somewhat supports the theory that 
the rules are at least as much about regulating nonlawyer practitioners as 
about regulating lawyers. 
Nevertheless, some features of the rules are not consistent with this 
theory.  Some agencies do adopt rules applying only to lawyers.  The most 
notable of these rules are the SEC’s Sarbanes-Oxley Rules.134  Other 
agencies whose rules apply only to lawyer representatives include EOIR, 
DNFSB, SBA, FTC, DOJ, JAG, USPS, CSHIB, and EPA.135  The existence 
of these rules obviously cannot be explained by the need to ensure that 
nonlawyers adhere to adequate standards of practice.  In addition, as already 
noted, most agencies do not have competence rules, contrary to what one 
would expect if the primary concern of the rules was nonlawyer 
practitioners’ abilities. 
More important, among the agencies permitting nonlawyer practice, only 
the USPTO follows the Model Rules format, which effectively makes the 
nonlawyer practitioners conform to almost all the lawyer ethics rules.  One 
would think that if agencies wanted to ensure that nonlawyer practitioners 
were subject to the same standards as lawyers, they would follow the Model 
 
 132. Id. § 10.20(a)(3). 
 133. 20 C.F.R. § 1740(b)(1) (2015).  This regulation was adopted to combat the practice 
of representatives withholding adverse evidence about the claimant’s condition from the 
agency. See Thomas Katsiotas, Comment, The Last Days of Social Security Disability:  How 
the Social Security Administration’s Policies on the Submission of Adverse Evidence and 
Non-Attorney Representation Have Contributed to Its Institutional Failure, 63 BUFF. L. REV. 
685, 706–10 (2015). 
 134. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (“This part sets forth minimum standards of professional conduct 
for attorneys practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer.”). 
 135. The rules may apply to parties or their “inside” agents (e.g., partners in a 
partnership) but not to nonlawyer representatives. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 776.2(d) (2015) 
(JAG); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101 (2015) (EOIR). 
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Rules more closely and include many more rules than they do, especially 
those regulating the lawyer-client relationship.136  Thus, even if the need to 
have rules governing nonlawyers explains the existence of agency rules, it 
does not fully explain their variety. 
4.  Inadequate State Enforcement 
and Incorporation of State Ethics Rules 
If agency rules are driven by inadequate state enforcement, one would 
expect agencies simply to incorporate state ethics rules.  Several agencies 
do have only an incorporation rule or very minimal additional rules.137  A 
number of agencies, however, have not only incorporation rules, but 
substantive rules as well, which suggests a concern with more than 
inadequate state enforcement.138 
5.  Multijurisdictional Practice and Reciprocal Discipline 
Agency rules facilitate multijurisdictional practice by generally allowing 
lawyers licensed in any jurisdiction to practice before the agency.  That fact, 
plus the prevalence of incorporation rules discussed in the previous 
section,139 suggests that agencies are not too concerned about the possibly 
conflicting ethics rules of different states, perhaps because these differences 
do not matter very much in the disciplinary issues that agencies most 
commonly see.  Moreover, several agencies do have reciprocal discipline 
rules,140 suggesting that they at least sometimes expect that state 
disciplinary authorities will discipline lawyers who practice before them.  
But these agencies fit no particular pattern.  They include several with 
detailed ethics rules (JAG, EOIR/DHS, DOL, BATF), some but not all of 
the financial agencies (FRB, FDIC, CFTC), and several agencies with 
minimal rules (DOI, FCC). 
 
 136. Cf. Katsiotas, supra note 133, at 720–23 (criticizing the SSA ethics rules as less 
stringent than state ethics rules and arguing that they are less effectively enforced). 
 137. See, e.g., 4 C.F.R. § 22.27 (2015) (GAO); 21 C.F.R. § 1316.51(b) (2015) (DEA); 28 
C.F.R. § 68.33(c)(3)(iii) (2015) (DOJ); 29 C.F.R. § 102.177(a) (2015) (NLRB); 39 C.F.R. 
§ 955.34 (2015) (USPS); id. § 3001.6(e) (PRC); 43 C.F.R. § 1.6(a) (2015) (DOI); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 500.4 (2015) (FCSC); 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.24(a)(2), (a)(4) (2015) (FCC). 
 138. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.26(b)(1), (2) (2015) (DOA); id. § 97.157 (same); id. §§ 110.8(h)(3), 
(4) (same); 10 C.F.R. §§ 1708.112(a), (b)(2) (2015) (DNFSB); 12 C.F.R. § 308.109(a)(1)(ii) 
(2015) (FDIC); id. § 1081.107(c)(1) (BCFP); 14 C.F.R. §§ 300.6(a), .20(a) (2015) (DOT, 
Aviation); 16 C.F.R. § 4.1(e)(1)(i)(B) (2015) (FTC); 17 C.F.R. § 14.8 (CFTC); id. 
§ 201.102(e)(ii) (SEC); 18 C.F.R. § 385.2101(c) (2015) (FERC); 29 C.F.R. § 18.22(c) 
(DOL); id. § 2200.104(a) (OSHRC); 31 C.F.R. § 8.41(b)(2)(i) (2015) (BATF) (ABA 
advertising and solicitation rules only); 32 C.F.R. § 776.19(a)(2) (2015) (JAG); 38 C.F.R. 
§ 14.632(d) (2015) (VA); 48 C.F.R. § 6101.33(a) (2015) (CBCA); 49 C.F.R. § 1103.11 
(2015) (STB) (U.S. courts). 
 139. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 140. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.102(e), (k) (2015) (EOIR/DHS); 12 C.F.R. §§ 263.94(d), 
(g) (FRB); id. § 308.109(b)(1) (FDIC); 17 C.F.R. § 14.6 (CFTC); 29 C.F.R. § 18.23(a)(1)(i), 
(ii) (DOL); 31 C.F.R. § 8.52(h) (BATF); 32 C.F.R. § 776.71 (JAG); 43 C.F.R. § 1.6(a) 
(2015) (DOI); 47 C.F.R. § 1.24(c) (2015) (FCC). 
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6.  Private Lawyer Interests 
Identifying rules that reflect lawyer interests rather than agency interests 
is not always easy.  Lawyers have been successful in opposing the adoption 
of certain rules, especially those mandating lawyer disclosure.  For 
example, although the securities bar lost the battle opposing the SEC’s 
Sarbanes-Oxley Rules, it successfully watered down the trigger for 
reporting up and dissuaded the SEC from adopting a “noisy withdrawal” 
provision.141  Lawyers also have successfully resisted attempts by some 
agencies to expand the application of their rules to nonadjudicatory matters 
(what I have called the “executive function”).142  On the other hand, as 
noted previously, many agency aiding and abetting rules impose more 
stringent standards on lawyers than Rule 1.2(d).143  Moreover, the extensive 
permission for nonlawyers to practice before agencies in competition with 
lawyers suggests that lawyer clout in this context may not be strong.  Thus, 
the capture theory, like the previous ones, may explain some rules (or their 
absence), but does not appear to explain a significant number or the patterns 
across agencies. 
7.  Experimentation 
A significant degree of variation in the agency rules may be attributable 
to a simple preference of the agency to address a particular topic or use 
particular language. 
In other cases, an agency may simply seek to clarify a recognized 
ambiguity in the Model Rules.  One example is the USPTO and JAG rules’ 
modifications to the Model Rules’ use of the word “law.”  The previous 
section discussed an ambiguity in this term, which could be interpreted to 
include agency regulations.144  The USPTO and JAG rules add the term 
“rule” (USPTO) or “regulation” (JAG) to some of their ethics rules using 
the term “law.”145  Interestingly, there is only one rule for which both 
agencies make the change:  the exception to the prohibition on ex parte 
contact with an official.146  In other cases, one agency adds “rule” or 
“regulation” but the other does not.147  In still other cases, most notably the 
confidentiality rule exception, neither agency adds to the word “law.”148 
 
 141. See, e.g., Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 26. 
 142. See Bernard W. Bell, Recalling the Lawyers:  The NHTSA, GM, and the Chevrolet 
Cobalt, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1917, 1918 (discussing proposed rules by the CPSC and 
FCC). 
 143. See supra notes 128–29. 
 144. See supra notes 48–58. 
 145. See infra notes 146–47. 
 146. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(b) (“A lawyer shall 
not . . . communicate ex parte with [a judge or other official] during the proceeding unless 
authorized to do so by law or court order.”), with 37 C.F.R. § 11.305(b) (2015) (USPTO) 
(adding “rule”), and 32 C.F.R. § 776.44(a)(2) (JAG) (2015) (adding “regulation” after “law” 
and “court order”). 
 147. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (“In representing a client, a 
lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer . . . is 
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8.  History and Experience 
Several agency rules appear to be directly related to the particular history 
or experience of that agency.  Most obviously, the SEC’s Sarbanes-Oxley 
Rules were a direct consequence of Enron, other corporate scandals, and the 
concern that the SEC did not act aggressively enough to police lawyer 
participation in financial fraud.149  Another rule that seems directly to 
reflect an agency’s experience is EOIR’s unique prohibition on 
“boilerplate” filings.150  In addition, both the SSA and VA Rules add to 
their confidentiality provisions prohibitions on a lawyer’s disclosure of 
information provided by the agency to the lawyer and the claimant 
concerning the claim.151  Once again, however, this theory does not appear 
to explain a large number of the agency rules, though a more detailed study 
of the history of each agency’s rules might reveal more information 
supporting this theory. 
 
authorized to do so by law or a court order.”), with 37 C.F.R. § 11.402(a) (USPTO) (adding 
“rule” after “law” and “court order”), and 32 C.F.R. § 776.50 (JAG) (leaving Model Rule 
4.2 unchanged); compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (stating that “a 
lawyer shall not represent a client . . . if . . . the representation will result in violation of the 
rules of professional conduct or other law”), with 37 C.F.R. § 11.116(a)(1) (USTPO) 
(leaving Model Rule 1.16(a)(1) unchanged in this respect), and 32 C.F.R. § 776.35(a)(1) 
(JAG) (adding “regulation” after “law” and “court order”); compare MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . seek to influence a judge . . . or other 
official by means prohibited by law.”), with 37 C.F.R. § 11.305(a) (USPTO) (leaving Model 
Rule 3.5(a) unchanged in this respect), and 32 C.F.R. § 776.44(a)(1) (JAG) (adding 
“regulation” after “law” and “court order”). 
 148. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (permitting a lawyer to 
reveal confidential information “to comply with other law or a court order”), with 37 C.F.R. 
§ 11.106(b)(6) (USPTO) (leaving Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) unchanged), and 32 C.F.R. § 776.25 
(JAG) (declining to include the exception); compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
1.4(a)(5) (requiring a lawyer to “consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by 
the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law”), with 37 C.F.R. § 11.104(a)(5) (USPTO) 
(leaving Model Rule 1.4(a)(5) unchanged), and 32 C.F.R. § 776.23 (JAG) (declining to 
include the rule); compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(2) (allowing consent 
to cure a concurrent conflict of interest if, among other things, “the representation is not 
prohibited by law”), with 37 C.F.R. § 11.107(b)(2) (USPTO) (leaving Model Rule 1.7(b)(2) 
unchanged), and 32 C.F.R. § 776.26 (JAG) (declining to include rule).  Neither agency 
adopts Model Rule 5.5(d)(2), allowing a lawyer not licensed in a jurisdiction to provide legal 
services there if the services are ones “that the lawyer is authorized by federal or other law or 
rule to provide in this jurisdiction.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.5(d)(2). 
 149. See generally Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra note 26, at 729–32 (discussing the 
history of the SEC rules). 
 150. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(u) (2015) (EOIR/DHS) (subjecting to discipline a practitioner 
who “[r]epeatedly files notices, motions, briefs, or claims that reflect little or no attention to 
the specific factual or legal issues applicable to a client’s case, but rather rely on boilerplate 
language indicative of a substantial failure to competently and diligently represent the 
client”). 
 151. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(c)(5) (2015) (SSA) (stating that a representative must not 
“[d]ivulge, without the claimant’s consent, except as may be authorized by regulations 
prescribed by us or as otherwise provided by Federal law, any information we furnish or 
disclose about a claim or prospective claim”); 38 C.F.R. § 14.632 (c)(10) (2015) (VA) 
(stating that a representative must not “[d]isclose, without the claimant’s authorization, any 
information provided by VA for purposes of representation”). 
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CONCLUSION 
The rules governing lawyers who practice before federal agencies are an 
important yet too often neglected part of the landscape of the law of 
lawyering.  State ethics rules recognize the tripartite structure of agencies as 
mini governments, but mostly to delineate which of the “advocacy” rules 
apply to these lawyers:  all, when an agency acts in its adjudicative 
capacity; some, when an agency acts in its legislative capacity; and none, 
when an agency acts in its executive capacity.  That approach leaves ample 
room for agencies to fill in gaps with their own rules.  Instead, agency rules 
mostly address lawyers appearing before them in their adjudicative capacity 
in ways that substantively duplicate state ethics rules. 
Nevertheless, agency rules exhibit a great deal of variety.  This variety 
has multiple causes, none of which is dominant.  The variety may be 
benign, or even desirable, but it is not without cost.  Perhaps the cost is not 
great for lawyers, who tend to specialize in representation before one or a 
limited number of related agencies.  But the challenges may be greater for 
law firms engaging in a broad regulatory practice, for state disciplinary 
authorities and courts that may need to interpret multiple agency rules, and 
for the agencies themselves for which the chaos may act as a barrier to 
desirable coordination and streamlining. 
Further study is needed to determine whether the agency rules are 
effective and work well as currently structured.  This Article has at least 
begun the task of making these rules somewhat more accessible and 
identifying some of their common themes.  Perhaps the ABA, the ALI, or 
the agencies themselves will find this project worth expanding. 
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APPENDIX A 
LIST OF FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH RULES 
GOVERNING PRACTICE BEFORE THE AGENCIES 
(IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER) 
1. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (BATF) 
2. Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP) 
3. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSHIB) 
4. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, General Services 
Administration (CBCA) 
5. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) 
6. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
7. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) 
8. Department of Agriculture (DOA) 
9. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) [formerly INS] 
10. Department of Interior (DOI) 
11. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
12. Department of Labor (DOL) 
13. Department of Transportation (DOT) (Aviation) 
14. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
15. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
16. Executive Office of Immigration Review, Department of Justice 
(EOIR) [formerly INS] 
17. Farm Credit Administration (FCA) 
18. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
19. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
20. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
21. Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
22. Federal Reserve Board (FRB) 
23. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
24. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States, 
Department of Justice (FCSC) 
25. General Accountability Office (GAO) 
26. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
27. International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce 
(ITA) 
28. International Trade Commission (ITC) 
29. Judge Advocate General (JAG) (Navy) 
30. National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) 
31. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of 
Transportation (NHTSA) 
32. National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
33. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
34. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
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35. Occupational Safety Health Review Commission (OSHRC) 
36. Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
37. Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) 
38. Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) 
39. Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) 
40. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
41. Small Business Administration (SBA) 
42. Social Security Administration (SSA) 
43. Surface Transportation Board (STB) [formerly Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC)] 
44. United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) 
45. United States Postal Service (USPS) 
46. Veterans Affairs (VA) 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF FEDERAL AGENCIES WITH RULES 
GOVERNING PRACTICE BEFORE THE AGENCIES 
(BY CODE TITLE) 
 Title 4:  General Accountability Office 
 Title 7:  Department of Agriculture (DOA) 
 Title 8:  Executive Office of Immigration Review, Department of 
Justice (EOIR); Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 Title 10:  Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); Defense 
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) 
 Title 12:  Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); Federal 
Reserve Board (FRB); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC); Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS); Farm Credit 
Administration (FCA); National Credit Union Administration 
(NCUA); Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (BCFP); 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) 
 Title 13:  Small Business Administration (SBA) 
 Title 14:  Department of Transportation (DOT) (Aviation) 
 Title 16:  Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC); 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
 Title 17:  Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
 Title 18:  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
 Title 19:  International Trade Commission (ITC); International 
Trade Administration (ITA) 
 Title 20:  Social Security Administration (SSA) 
 Title 21:  Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
 Title 28:  Department of Justice (DOJ) 
 Title 29:  Department of Labor (DOL); National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB); Occupational Safety Health Review Commission 
(OSHRC) 
 Title 31:  Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (BATF); 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS); Office of Foreign Asset Control 
(OFAC) 
 Title 32:  Judge Advocate General (JAG) (Navy) 
 Title 37:  United States Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) 
 Title 38:  Veterans Affairs (VA) 
 Title 39:  United States Postal Service (USPS); Postal Regulatory 
Commission (PRC) 
 Title 40:  Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
(CSHIB); Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
 Title 43:  Department of Interior (DOI) 
 Title 45:  Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) 
 Title 47:  Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
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 Title 48:  Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, General Services 
Administration (CBCA) 
 Title 49:  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); 
Surface Transportation Board (STB) 
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APPENDIX C 
TITLES OF AND CITES FOR FEDERAL AGENCY RULES 
GOVERNING PRACTICE BEFORE THE AGENCIES 
1. BATF:  Duties and Restrictions Relating to Practice, 31 CFR 
Subt. A, Pt. 8, Subpt. D, §§ 8.31–.42, 8.52 
2. BCFP:  Rules of Practice for Adjudication Proceedings, General 
Rules, 12 CFR Ch. X, Pt. 1081, Subpt. A, §§ 1081.107–.110 
3. CSHIB:  Administrative Investigations, 40 CFR Ch. VI, Pt. 
1610, § 1610.1 
4. CBCA:  Contract Dispute Cases, Ex Parte Contact; Sanctions 
and Other Proceedings, 48 CFR Ch. 61, Pt. 6101, § 6101.33 
5. CPSC:  Rules of Practice for Appellate Proceedings; 
Appearances, Standards of Conduct, 16 CFR Ch. 8, Subch. A, Pt. 
1025, §§ 1025.66, 1025.68 
6. CFTC:  Rules of Practice, General Provisions, 17 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 
10, §§ 10.10–.11; Rules Relating to Investigations, Rights of 
Witnesses, 17 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 11, § 11.7; Rules Relating to 
Reparations, General Information and Preliminary Consideration 
of Pleadings, 17 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 12, Subpt. A, §§ 12.7, 12.9; 
Rules Relating to Suspension or Disbarment from Appearance 
and Practice, 17 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 14, §§ 14.2–.8 
7. DNFSB:  Procedures for Safety Investigations, 10 CFR Ch. 
XVII, Pt. 1708, §§ 1708.109–.112 
8. DOA:  Departmental Proceedings, Representation Before the 
Department of Agriculture, 7 CFR Subt. A, Pt. 1, Supbt. B, 
§ 1.26; Procedures Related to Administrative Hearings Under the 
Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act of 1986, 12 CFR Subt. A, Pt. 
1, Subpt. H; Rules of Practice Governing Formal Adjuicatory 
Proceedings Instituted by the Secretary Under Various Statutes, 
12 CFR Subt. A, Pt. 1, Subpt. L, §§ 1.151(b), 1.303, 1.316, 
1.328(a); Commodity Laboratory Testing Programs, Plant 
Variety and Protection, Attorneys and Agents, Professional 
Conduct, 7 CFR Subt. B, Ch. I, Subch. E, Pt. 97, § 97.157, Pt. 
110; Rules of Practice, § 110.8(h) 
9. DHS:  Professional Conduct for Practitioners—Rules and 
Procedures, 8 CFR Ch. I, Subch. B, Pt. 292, § 292.3; 
Professional Conduct for Practitioners—Rules and Procedures, 
Grounds, 8 CFR Ch. V, Subch. A, Pt. 1003, Subpt. G, 
§ 1003.102 
10. DOI:  Practices Before the Department of the Interior, 43 CFR 
Subt. A, Pt. 1, §§ 1.2–.6 
11. DOJ:  Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative 
Hearings Before Administrative Law Judges in Cases Involving 
Allocations of Unlawful Employment of Aliens, Unfair 
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Immigration-Related Employment Practices, and Document 
Fraud, 27 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 68, § 68.33(c)(3)(iii); Rules of 
Procedure for Assessment of Civil Penalties for Possession of 
Certain Controlled Substances, Standards of Conduct, 28 CFR 
Ch. I, Pt. 76, §§ 76.15, 76.31 
12. DOL:  Rules of Practice and Procedure for Administrative 
Hearings Before the Office of Administrative Law Judges, 29 
CFR Subt. A, Pt. 18, Subpt A, §§ 18.14, 18.22–.23, 18.35 
13. DOT:  Rules of Conduct in DOT Proceedings Under This 
Chapter, 14 CFR Ch. II, Subch. B, Pt. 300, §§ 300.5–.6, 300.13–
.14, 300.19–.20 
14. DEA:  Administrative Hearings, Conduct of Hearing and Parties, 
21 CFR Ch. II, Pt. 1316, Sbpt. D, § 1316.51(b) 
15. EPA:  Program Fraud Civil Remedies, 40 CFR Ch. I, Subch. A, 
Pt. 27, § 27.3 (Basis for Civil Penalties and Assessments), 
§ 27.15 (Ex Parte Contacts), § 27.29 (Sanctions); 40 CFR Ch. VI 
16. EOIR:  Professional Conduct for Practitioners—Rules and 
Procedures, Grounds, 8 CFR Ch. V, Subch. A, Pt. 1003, Subpt. 
G, §§ 1003.102–.103; Ch. V, Subch. B, Pt. 1292, § 1292.3 
17. FCA:  Rules Applicable to Formal Hearings, 12 CFR Ch. VI, 
Subch. B, Pt. 622, Subpt. A; Rules and Procedures Applicable to 
Formal Investigations, Conduct of Investigation, §§ 622.3, 622.7; 
12 CFR Ch. VI, Subch. B, Pt. 622, Subpt. D, § 622.105(d)(2) 
18. FCC:  General Rules of Practice and Procedure; Parties, 
Practitioners, and Witnesses; Censure, Suspension, or 
Disbarment of Attorneys, 47 CFR Ch. I, Subch. A, Pt. 1, Subpt. 
A, § 1.24; Multichannel Video and Cable Television Service, 
Program Access Proceedings, 47 CFR Ch. I, Subch. C, Pt. 76, 
Subpt. O, § 76.1003(k) 
19. FDIC:  Uniform Rules of Practice and Procedure, 12 CFR Ch. 
III, Subch. A, Pt. 308, §§ 308.6–.9, 308.108–.109, 308.148, 
390.355(b) 
20. FERC:  Rules Relating to Investigations, Rights of Witnesses, 18 
CFR Ch. I, Subch. A, § 1b.16; Appearance and Practice Before 
the Commission, 18 CFR Ch. I, Subch. X, Pt. 385, Subpt. U, 
§ 385.2101 
21. FHFA:  Parties and Representation Practice Before the Federal 
Housing Agency; Rules of Practice and Procedure, 12 CFR Ch. 
XII, Subch. A, Pt. 1209, Subpt. C, §§ 1209.13–.14; Standards of 
Conduct, 12 CFR Ch. XII, Subch. A, Pt. 1209, Subpt. D 
§§ 1209.73–.74 
22. FRB:  Uniform Rules of Practice and Procedure, 12 CFR Ch. II, 
Subch. A, Pt. 263, Subpt. A, §§ 263.6–.9; Practice Before the 
Board, Subpt. F, §§ 263.91–.94 
23. FTC:  Noncompliance with Compulsory Process, 16 CFR Ch. I, 
Subch. A, Pt. 2, Subpt. A, § 2.13; Organization, Procedures and 
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Rules of Practice, Miscellaneous Rules:  Appearances, Ex Parte 
Communications, 16 CFR Ch. I, Subch. A, Pt. 4, §§  4.1, 4.7 
24. FCSC:  Rules of Practice, Appearance and Practice, 45 CFR 
Subt. B, Ch. V, Subch. A, Pt. 500, § 500.4 
25. GAO:  Rules of Procedure of the Government Accountability 
Office Contract Appeals Board, 4 CFR Ch. I, Subch. B, Pt. 22, 
§§ 22.8(j), 22.10, 22.27. 
26. IRS:  Duties and Restrictions Relating to Practice Before the 
Internal Revenue Service, 31 CFR Subt. A, Pt. 10, Subpt. B, 
§§ 10.22–.37 
27. ITA:  Information and Argument, 19 CFR Ch. III, Pt. 351, 
§§ 351.303(g)(2), 351.306(d), 351.313 
28. ITC:  Rules of General Applicability, 19 CFR Ch. II, Subch. C, 
Pt. 201, § 201.15; Pt. 210, §§ 210.2, 210.4(c), 210.4(d)(2), 
210.33(b), 210.34(c) 
29. JAG:  Professional Conduct of Attorneys Practicing Under the 
Cognizance and Supervision of the Judge Advocate General, 32 
CFR Subt. A., Ch. VI, Pt. 776, §§ 776.18–.71 
30. NCUA:  Uniform Rules of Practice and Procedure, 12 CFR Ch. 
VII, Subch. A, Pt. 747, Subpt. A, §§ 747.6–.9; Local Rules 
Applicable to Formal Investigative Proceedings, Rights of 
Witnesses, Ch. VII, Subch. A, Pt. 747, Subpt. I, § 747.807(d) 
31. NHTSA:  Adjudicative Procedures:  Appearances; Standards of 
Conduct, 49 CFR Subt. B, Ch. V, Pt. 511, §§ 511.76, 711.78 
32. NLRB:  Misconduct by Attorneys or Party Representatives, 29 
CFR Subt. B, Ch. I, Pt. 102, Subpt. W, § 102.177 
33. NTSB:  Rules of Practice in Air Safety Proceedings, Ex Parte 
Communications, 49 CFR Subt. B, Ch. VIII, Pt. 821, Subpt. J, 
§§ 821.60–.63 
34. NRC:  Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rules of 
General Applicability, 10 CFR Ch. 1, Pt. 2, Subpt. C, §§ 2.314, 
2.347; Subpt. O, § 2.1509 
35. OSHRC:  Rules of Procedure, Parties and Representatives, 
Appearances and Withdrawals, 29 CFR Subt. B, Ch. XX, Pt. 
2200, Subpt. B, § 2200.23; Rules of Procedure, Miscellaneous 
Provisions, 29 CFR Subt. B, Ch. XX, Pt. 2200, Subpt. G 
§§ 2200.104–.105 
36. OCC:  Uniform Rules of Practice and Procedure, 12 CFR Ch. I, 
Pt. 19, Subpt. A, §§ 19.6–.9; Formal Investigations, Rights of 
Witnesses, 12 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 19, Subpt. J, § 19.183(e); Rules of 
Practice and Procedure in Adjudicatory Proceedings, Uniform 
Rules of Practice and Procedure, 12 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 109, 
§§ 209.6–.9; 12 CFR § 163.180(b) 
37. OFAC:  Appearance and Practice, 31 CFR Subt. B, Ch. V, Pt. 
501, Subpt. D, § 501.704(d) 
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38. OTS:  Uniform Rules of Practice and Procedure, 12 CFR Ch. V, 
Pt. 509, Subpt. A, §§ 509.6–.9; Practice Before the Office, 12 
CFR Ch. V, Pt. 513, §§ 513.4(a), 563.180(b) 
39. PRC:  Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rules of General 
Applicability, 39 CFR Ch. III, Subch. A, Pt. 3001, Subpt. A, 
§ 3001.6(e) 
40. SEC:  Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys 
Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission in the 
Representation of an Issuer, 17 CFR Ch. II, Pt. 205; Appearance 
and Practice Before the Commission, 17 CFR § 201.102(e) 
41. SBA:  Rules of Procedure Governing Cases Before the Office of 
Hearings and Appeals, Rules of Practice, 13 CFR Ch. I, Pt. 134, 
Subpt. B, §§ 134.209, 134.219, 134.220 
42. SSA:  Rules of Conduct and Standards of Responsibility for 
Representatives, 20 CFR § 404.1740 
43. STB:  Canons of Ethics, 49 CFR Subt. B, Ch. X, Subch. B, Pt. 
1103, Subpt. B, §§ 1103.10–.35 
44. USPTO:  Rules of Professional Conduct, 37 CFR Ch. I, Subch. 
A, Pt. 11, Subpt. D, §§ 11.101–.901 
45. USPS:  Rules of Practice Before the Postal Service Board of 
Contract Appeals, 39 CFR Ch. I, Subch. N, Pt. 955, §§ 955.33, 
955.34 
46. VA:  Standards of Conduct for Persons Providing Representation 
Before the Department, 38 CFR § 14.632 
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APPENDIX D 
CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF AGENCIES WITH RULES 
(BY ORIGINAL DATE OF ADOPTION) 
 1958:  EOIR/DHS [INS] 
 1959:  NLRB 
 1962:  NRC 
 1964:  DOI 
 1966:  IRS 
 1967:  FTC; DOA 
 1971:  DEA; PRC 
 1972:  OSHRC 
 1976:  CFTC 
 1977:  DOT (Aviation); BATF 
 1978:  FERC 
 1980:  CPSC 
 1982:  STB 
 1983:  DOL 
 1986:  FCA 
 1987:  SEC (Rule 102(e)) 
 1988:  VA; EPA 
 1991:  OTS; DOJ 
 1992:  NCUA; FCC 
 1994:  FRB; ITC 
 1996:  FDIC 
 1997:  OFAC 
 1998:  SSA 
 2000:  USPTO; JAG; CSHIB 
 2001:  FCSC 
 2002:  NHTSA 
 2003:  NTSB; SEC (Sox Rules) 
 2005:  GAO 
 2007:  CBCA 
 2008:  FHFA 
 2009:  USPS 
 2010:  SBA 
 2011:  OCC 
 2013:  BCFP; ITA 
 2014:  DNFSB 
